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Stefania Dumitra Betea, Odder. Mathilde Catherina Beth, Greve. Neda Beytghanem Heyzani, Aarhus. Masarat Bibi, Hvidovre. Edwige Bidjeck, Odense. Elin Dara Bidu, Assens. Sahar Bigamiry, Horsens. Sabrina Abraham Bihon, Herlev. Anton Bilenko, Odense. Dhool Ali Bille, Kolding. Rasim Binaku, Haderslev. Behnaz Binesh, Gladsaxe. Malcolm Robert Bird, Odense.

Mirsen Biscevic, Greve. Ainura Bizhanova, Rudersdal. Zakia Majed Bjay, Odense. Denis Bjelevac, Varde. Astrid Blom, Egedal. Yury Bobkov, Herlev.

Olena Boeck-Hansen, Silkeborg. Boghos Haygas Boghos, Aarhus. Argin Bogusian, Aabenraa. Sidrah Batool Bokhari, Frederiksberg. Oleksandr Bondar, Frederiksberg. Shahrouz Bonyadi, Aalborg. Muslim Naipovich Borchashvili, Rudersdal.

Elvis Boric, Odense. Olga Andreyevna Borissova, Kolding. Elma Boskailo, Horsens. Benjamin Botic, Aarhus. Jemilea Khleiwi Boty, Odense. Hayat Boudina, Guldborgsund. Djamal Adeoti Alao Boussari, Gentofte. Faiza Boussihmed, Bornholm. Yuliya Boyko, Odense. Svetlana Breum, Aarhus. Since the election crackdown last year, well over a thousand people have fled Iran to seek asylum in neighboring countries.

Interrogators used torture to extract confessions, on which the judiciary relied on to sentence people to long prison terms and even death. Restrictions on freedom of expression and association, as well as religious and gender-based discrimination, continued unabated. The Foreign and Commonwealth Offices FCO Annual Report on Human Rights , released March , observed that: The year was marked by a determined government crackdown against protesters and a continuation of the suppression of rights that followed the disputed June presidential election.

January saw a further wave of arrests, and riot police and armed militia members were a visible presence on streets across the capital Tehran; peaceful vigils were broken up, and on 28 January, two young political prisoners were executed. By mid-February, an overwhelming security presence put an end to large public demonstrations. Throughout the year arrests and intimidation continued, particularly among lawyers, opposition politicians, journalists, student and trade unionists, and religious and ethnic minorities.

An already heavily proscribed media faced further restriction, and military resources were increasingly used to monitor and restrict internet usage. Alongside the political repression, executions increased to over in , according to NGO [non governmental organisation] figures, an execution rate surpassed only by China. Iran ended the year with human rights more restricted than at any time during the last decade.

The report of the Secretary-General to the UN General Assembly dated 15 September stated that, since his last report in September , there had been: further negative developments in the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some encouraging milestones and positive developments, such as the countrys ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in October , its submission of long-overdue periodic reports to the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the completion of its universal periodic review before the Human Rights Council were unfortunately overshadowed by an intensified crackdown on human rights defenders, in particular womens rights activists, journalists and Government opponents in relation to post-election unrest in June Concerns about torture, arbitrary detentions and unfair trials continued to be raised by United Nations human rights mechanisms.

There was a noticeable increase in application of the death penalty, including in cases involving political opponents and. Discrimination persisted against minority groups and in some cases amounted to persecution. The executive branch, the Revolutionary Guards and security services increasingly engaged in the arbitrary exercise of power. As Iran became more authoritarian, human rights conditions deteriorated dramatically.

A military crackdown blocked public demonstrations, while a wave of convictions and executions demonstrated the almost absolute power of the state. Yet Irans brutality also revealed the regimes fear of its own citizens, democracy and dissent. Sweeping controls on domestic and international media aimed at reducing Iranians contact with the outside world were imposed.

Individuals and groups risked arrest, torture and imprisonment if perceived as co-operating with human rights and foreign-based Persian-language media organizations. Political dissidents, womens and minority rights activists and other human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and students were rounded up in mass and other arrests and hundreds were imprisoned.

Torture and other ill-treatment of detainees were routine and committed with impunity. Women continued to face discrimination under the law and in practice. The authorities acknowledged executions, but there were credible reports of more than other executions. The true total could be even higher. At least one juvenile offender was executed. Sentences of death by stoning continued to be passed, but no stonings were known to have been carried out.

Floggings and an increased number of amputations were carried out. The member Geneva council approved by 22 to seven the Swedish resolution to appoint a special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran The text voiced concern at Irans crackdown on opposition figures and increased use of the death penalty and called on the Islamic republic to cooperate with the envoy to be named to the independent post Iran rejected the resolution and defended its unflinching commitment to human rights, saying that it has extended invitations to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay to visit the country this year [].

The Secretary-General has been deeply troubled by reports of increased executions, amputations, arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trials, and possible torture and ill-treatment of human rights activists, lawyers, journalists and opposition activists.

The country has become enveloped in a profound human rights crisis marked by systematic violations of both international law and the rights protected by Irans own constitution. The government has been engaged in a binge of executions, routine torture, and mass arbitrary detentions.

Journalists, human rights defenders, civil society activists, as well as, minority ethnic and religious groups face growing repression. Authorities, moreover, repeatedly silence domestic efforts to hold the government accountable.

See the individual sections throughout the Human Rights section of this report for information on the effect of the above in practice, in particular Ethnic Minorities and Children.

Despite regular requests made by the Special Rapporteurs since then, All country visit requests remain outstanding. Also the human rights situation for various groups is detailed in the sections following: Political affiliation; 34 The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 13 May Freedom of speech and media including journalists and bloggers ; Freedom of religion, Human rights institutions and activists, Ethnic groups, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender persons; Women and Children.

A large share of opiates leaving Afghanistan at least 40 percent transits Iran for domestic consumption as well as to consumers in Russia and Europe. There have been reports from U. Much of the methamphetamine being trafficked appears to have been produced in Iran itself. More than Iranians have been charged with drug trafficking in Malaysia and seizures of methamphetamine from Iranian criminals there during were in excess of one-quarter metric tonIn addition, seizures of methamphetamine in Iran itself were almost 2.

As Iran strives to achieve this goal, it also reduces the quantity of Afghan drugs reaching markets in the West.

Iran is frequently the country reporting the largest seizures of opiates in the world. Nevertheless, traffickers from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran itself continue to cause major disruption along Irans eastern border. Traffickers have also stepped up use of Irans airports and railways to move drugs, and Iran has responded by using body scanners and dog teams to increase drug seizures at airports and from railway freight.

In October, the Interior Minister stated that the campaign against drug trafficking was being intensified, and the Prosecutor General stated in the same month that new measures had been taken to speed up the judicial processing of drug-trafficking cases, including by referring all such cases to his office, thereby denying them a right to appeal to a higher tribunal, as is required under international law.

JUNE In December the amended Anti-Narcotics Law came into force apparently making it easier to sentence to death those convicted of trafficking. It extended the scope of the death penalty to include additional categories of illegal drugs for example, crystal meth , possession of which became punishable by death. Under the Anti-Narcotics Law, some defendants are not granted a right to appeal, as their convictions and sentences are confirmed by the state Prosecutor-General.

The Secretary-Generals interim report of 14 March also commented on the new law, reporting that: A new Anti-Narcotics law was passed in December and came into force on 4 January Article 18 provides for the death penalty for drug traffickers and major traders and also foresees punishment ranging from one to fifteen years travel ban for carrying or smuggling any quantity of drugs.

The new law classes drug addicted persons as criminals unless they are in possession of a certificate of treatment. On 27 December , the Deputy Prosecutor General for Legal Affairs warned of a stricter approach in dealing with drug trafficking and stressed that drug traffickers and major drug traders will face execution under the new anti-narcotics law.

The IHRA report also noted: Some sources estimate that Iran has executed 10, drug traffickers since the revolution of , although a number of these are alleged to have been political dissidents who were charged with drug crimes. The country issued a judicial ban on executing minors for drug offences in late Officials have also vowed to step up enforcement measures against drug trafficking.

Sixty-seven of those [86 people] executed in January had been convicted of drug trafficking. Those executed appeared to be amongst the most vulnerable sectors of society. When OHCHR [Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights] staff sought further information from Iranian counterparts during a visit to Tehran in December , they confirmed that 60 persons had been executed in Mashhad in pending cases mostly linked to drug trafficking.

On 3 January , seven persons convicted of drug trafficking were hanged in the western city of Kermanshah. On 19 January , 10 persons were executed in Rajai Shahr prison in relation to drug trafficking. Although the Iranian authorities denied this, they acknowledged that over 4, Afghans were detained in Iran, the majority for drug trafficking. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps IRGC one of the Iranian intelligence services, is a complex combination of institutions army forces, intelligence services, undercover and special operations forces, police, paramilitary forces and business groups with implications at a global level.

The Ministry of Intelligence and Security MOIS another Iranian intelligence service, is more traditional and has both foreign and domestic intelligence responsibilities.

The secrecy that characterizes the Iranian regime and organizations is specific to the intelligence services too. Irans Supreme National Security Council SNSC the state official organization that makes foreign and military decisions and Supreme Leaders Intelligence Unit are two semicollateral organizations that gather all the intelligence authorities.

Their decisions must ultimately be approved by the Supreme Leader. The Basij and informal groups known as the Ansar-e Hizballah Helpers of the Party of God were aligned with extreme conservative members of the leadership and acted as vigilantes Corruption and impunity were problems.

Regular and paramilitary security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses, but there were no transparent mechanisms to investigate security force abuses and no reports of government actions to reform the abusers. The agency is responsible for fighting opposition to the regime not only at home but also abroad. Some Iranian intelligence agents have operated in foreign locations under diplomatic cover, as part of a drive to collect intelligence on Iranian opposition elements operating outside Iran.

Moslehi, and his predecessor as intelligence chief, Mohseni Ejei, were among a group of senior Iranian officials blacklisted in September by the US Treasury Department which accused them of serious human rights abuses. The MOIS addresses ethnic and sectarian issues within the country, and it monitors the clerical community and government officials.

Although MOIS officers are vetted for ideological conformity, very few can be considered extreme ideological Islamists. The MOIS has a role in defending Iran against cyber attack and in monitoring and censoring the internet. The agency has also been involved in investigating the spread of the Stuxnet malware virus, detected in , which disrupted computer systems at Iranian nuclear facilities. Although nominally under the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior, the Supreme Leader has to approve a nominee that the president proposes as LEF chief Units within the LEF have overlapping responsibilities.

However, there is a similar unit in the LEF called the Edareyeh Amaken Omumi Public Establishments Office , which concerns itself with the type of music people listen to, the interaction of people of the opposite sex in public places and various forms of perceived lewd behaviour Maintaining security along Irans borders is an important role of the LEF Iran has been stepping up security on its borders, with the LEF using what has been described as modern technologies in order to counter drug trafficking, smuggling and the movement of individuals considered to pose a threat to state security.

The key duties fall to the Iranian police, the Intelligence Ministry, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij government-sponsored militia. The actions of each of these branches in the postelection protests of contributed to a climate of fear surrounding their activities and greatly reduced the confidence of ordinary Iranian citizens in their ability to enforce the law impartially.

The Police unit specializes in rapid-response activities in urban areas. The Marine police are said to have over 90 inshore patrol and over 40 harbor boats.

The police force also includes women officers. It has since become a major military, political and economic force in Iran, with close ties to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former member It also controls the paramilitary Basij Resistance Force and the powerful bonyads, or charitable foundations, which run a considerable part of the Iranian economy. The IRGC consists of ground, naval, and aviation troops, which parallel the structure of the regular military.

There is also an Intelligence Directorate. The IRGC has a cultural and military mission. Its cultural role is in safeguarding the achievements of the Islamic Revolution, while its military role lies in supporting the regular forces when required.

Because of its dual political and military role, the IRGC also has an internal security role, which includes local intelligence gathering; this role has grown in importance since the end of the war with Iraq.

While co-operation between the IRGC and the national police is institutionalised, it is best to treat the IRGC predominantly as a military land force that parallels the regular army, a role institutionalised by the war-fighting demands of the Iran-Iraq war. The IRGCs paramilitary organisation, the Basij, plays an increasingly prominent role in the suppression of domestic unrest.

Throughout the s, the regular army and IRGC alike protested at being ordered to suppress citizens demonstrating against Irans worsening economic conditions.

For instance, in August , they refused orders to open fire on protesters in Qazvin. The Basij, however, had 40 The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 13 May They were similarly deployed by conservative clerics to quell the student riots of and The Basij were among the forces deployed to suppress the protests following the presidential election.

This means that it monitors all scientists, leads the security forces from the nuclear installations, provides guard against sabotages and performs counterintelligence operations in order to prevent the recruit[ment] of Iranian nuclear scientists by other countries. After his disputed re-election in June [], the Revolutionary Guards warned demonstrators against further protests.

Many people in Iran saw the subsequent crackdown on the opposition as an assertion of control by the Revolutionary Guards. It is an impression the Guards have confirmed themselves, and members of the Basij militia, a group affiliated with the Guards, have been prominent in putting down the opposition protests. There are also reports that the Revolutionary Guards have increased their already substantial stake in Irans economy, with the purchase of a majority stake in the main telecommunications company.

The Guards are thought to control around a third of Irans economy through a series of subsidiaries and trusts. The Guards engineering wing, Khatam-ol-Anbia also known by an acronym, GHORB , has been awarded several multi-billion-dollar construction and engineering contracts, including the operation of Tehrans new Imam Khomeini international airport. Former members of the IRGC, including Ahmadinejad, hold key positions within the government, and its commercial arms have been awarded the right of first refusal for government contracts, some of which have been extremely lucrative.

In a shake-up, in September Irans Revolutionary Guards Pasdarans established 31 divisions and an autonomous missile command. The reported new structure was largely decentralized, with the force broken into 31 provincal corps, possibly to reflect a far greater internal role, with one for each of Irans 31 Provinces. The al Quds forces are under the command of Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani and have supported non-state actors in many foreign countries.

Links to Sunni extremist groups like Al Qaida have been reported, but never convincingly confirmed. Many U. These may include the shaped charge components used in some IEDs [improvised explosive devices] in Iraq and the more advanced components used in explosively formed projectiles, including the weapon assembly, copper slugs, radio links used to activate such devices, and the infrared triggering mechanisms. These devices are very similar to those used in Lebanon, and some seem to operate on the same radio frequencies.

Shaped charge weapons first began to appear in Iraq in August , but became a serious threat in On January 11, , the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated in a testimony before the U. A report by the Pentagon in December claimed that the Qods Force provided many of the explosives and ammunition used by Shia militia groups in Iraq which have attacked coalition and Iraqi government forces. These claims have always been denied by Tehran.

In a statement, the US Department of the Treasury said that the Qods Force was the Iranian regimes primary instrument for providing lethal support to the Taliban.

Basij 42 The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 13 May Basij personnel are the eyes and ears of the Islamic regime and are considered extremely loyal. The Basij Force also contributes to the gathering of intelligence. Its name comes from Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij, meaning The Mobilization and Resistance Force and it was founded in The structure of Basij is slightly similar with the structure of a communist party from certain totalitarian states.

There are several levels of society: every Iranian city of a considerable size is divided into two areas or regions whereas in the small Iranian towns and villages there are cells organized as social, religious and governmental bodies. There are also Basij units for students, workers and members of the tribes. Basij also created Ashura Brigades for men and al-Zahra Brigades for women.

The Iran Primer, a joint product of the U. Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, produced a paper on the Basij dated 21 October which stated that: Estimates of the total number of Basij vary widely.

But a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think-tank, put the number of full-time, uniformed and active members at 90,, with another , reservists and some 1 million that could be mobilized when necessary.

Persian language open-source material does not provide any information about what percentage of the force is full time, reservists or paid members of the organization.

Members include women as well as men, old as well as young. During the Iran-Iraq War, Basij volunteers were as young as 12 years old, with some of the older members over 60 years old. Most today are believed to be between high school age and the mid30s. The perks can include university spots, access to government jobs and preferential treatment.

The same source continued: The Basij statute distinguishes between three types of members: Regular members, who are mobilized in wartime and engage in developmental activities in peacetime.

Regular members are volunteers and are unpaid, unless they engage in war-time duty. Active Members, who have had extensive ideological and political indoctrination, and who also receive payment for peacetime work.

The Basij statute says members are selected or recruited under the supervision of clergy of the neighborhoods and trusted citizens and legal associations of the neighborhoods. The neighborhood mosques provide background information about each volunteer applicant; the local mosque also functions as the Basij headquarters for the neighborhood.

For full-time paid positions, applicants must apply at central offices of the Basij, in provincial headquarters of the Basij. It maintains a formal presence in all government offices, universities, schools, trade associations, hospitals and factories.

Formed on the orders of the Ayatollah Khomeini in November after the US Embassy siege, the Basij militia is designed to defend the Islamic republic against internal enemies and foreign intervention. Now apparently based at more than 70, locations nationwide, members of the Basij are organised into five main elements: the Pupil Basij, the Student Basij, the University Basij, the Public Service Basij and the Tribal Basij.

The diverse range of these units demonstrates the various roles of the militia, and the fact that the aim of the Basij is not just to forge a paramilitary force, but to reinforce support for the regime through ideological dissemination The preservation of internal security is the primary role of the Basij. In carrying out their ideologically-based duties, Basij members act as moral police in towns and cities by enforcing the hijab, arresting women for violating the dress code, prohibiting male-female fraternisation, monitoring the activities of citizens, seizing indecent material and satellite dish antennae, intelligence gathering and even harassing government critics and intellectuals.

Basij volunteers also act as bailiffs for local courts. However: The Basijs performance since the June election has been mixed. It managed to suppress street protests in the provinces with the help of the local police forces, but maintaining order in major urban centers, especially Tehran, was more difficult. And their actions have faced backlash. On June 15, Basij members reportedly shot and killed protesters at Azadi Square who were forcing their way into the local militia station.

From June 22 onward, the Basij constituted only a minority of the forces cracking down on protesters. Basij commander Hossein Taeb, a Shiite cleric with the rank of hojatoleslam, claimed that eight Basij had been killed and wounded during the antigovernment protests The regime signaled its displeasure with the Basijs performance.

In October , Taeb was removed as Basij chief. A few days later, the militia was formally integrated into the Revolutionary Guards ground forces, with Brig. Mohammad Naghdi as the 44 The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 13 May JUNE new chief.

In , the Basij focused significant attention on combating perceived threats to the regime from the Internet. Thousands of members were educated in blogging and filtering of dissident websites, Basij officials acknowledged. A report by the Crown Centre for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University, Massachusetts, published in September , includes further detailed information on the membership and ideological and political training of the Basij.

Ansar-e Hezbollah Helpers of the Party of God 9. The vigilante group uses force but is not part of official law enforcement. Members wear plain clothes. Ansar-e-Hezbollah is often unleashed against protesters, notably during the Iran student riots.

The group claims to be a grassroots movement which calls for harsh policies against opponents of the Islamic theocratic system and promotes itself as fully in line with the ideals propagated by the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini. In reality, its senior members and most of its activists are associated with and funded by state organs under hardline control.

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